Pembridgecap

A Wealth Creation Journal

Page 2 of 7

The New IBKR Credit Card: Potentially Superior Fintech In Disguise?

Summary

  • there’s much fuzz on app-only fintechs issuing FX commission free credit cards
  • we compare these fintechs with the capabilities of the unknown and unloved new IBKR MasterCard and conclude it could be superior to any existing card
  • the IBKR card could be a game changer for IBKR investors: the card could drive further customer equity growth as IBKR accounts have been gaining turnkey online-banking and brokerage capabilities

Introduction

Because of regulatory differences, Europe has been faster than the United States to adopt online-/app-only banking services such as unicorn Revolut, N26, and Monzo. Revolut already claims more than 2 million users.

These players offer online banking solutions with pre-paid credit cards that allow users to pay globally with drastically lower or “no” forex commissions. At a typical bank in the mainland of Europe, one pays 1.5-4% forex commissions outside the Eurozone, while in the UK and the US these commissions have outliers as high as 8%. Withdrawing cash from an ATM can be even more expensive, paying the same range of percentage commission with fixed costs on top as high as ~5-10 USD per withdrawal (excluding the fixed costs the ATM charge). Other benefits from these fintech services are the immediate information to consumer about a payment confirmation, never needing to go into a bank again to block your credit card, change its limits, with in-app control over security features.

In the US on the other hand, the lowest-cost online broker Interactive Brokers “IBKR” recently launched its own credit card. As opposed to the above players, IBKR credit cards are not widely known with millennials or in fintech circles. As I will show, the unknown and unloved IBKR credit card could be superior compared to all current European counterparts but has extra advantages on top such as deep borrowing capacity (the ability to pay large sums is typically a unique credit card selling point) at the absolute cheapest rate in the world. TransferWise and Revolut are launching their own credit card soon in the US as well.

While the IBKR MasterCard is currently only available to US clients, it is coming to Canada and Europe respectively in ‘Q4 ‘18 and in ’19-’20 (as per investor relations’ answer).

A comparison of the fintech players

First, let’s compare the European fintech players to pick the financially most attractive proposition to clients. I will then compare this player to the all-new IBKR credit card.

While the pan-European German start-up N26 and exclusively-UK player Monzo offer “zero commission MasterCard forex rates” (i.e. they offer the same FX terms) for payments in foreign currencies, pan-European Revolut claims to offer the “interbank rate” during weekdays, with an added 0.5% commission during weekends to “compensate for the FX risk”. Because MasterCard (and Visa) do not offer any transparency on their official FX rates calculations but do publish daily official rates here, my comparison is based on empirical data.

As it turns out, none of the providers of “commission free” credit cards are fully commission free. While the “commission free MasterCard forex rates” has a hidden wholesale FX commission for MasterCard embedded in N26 and Monzo’s case, Revolut says it uses the real-time interbank bid price. However, based on my analysis using live data from the deep IBKR forex market that is freely available for customers, I found Revolut settlement rates are a bit worse than the real interbank bid prices of IBKR. Let’s first do a comparison between the “fintech” players before we move on to why “old” IBKR could be even better.

Based on datapoints in a personal holiday in Mexico using both N26 and Revolut, I found that Revolut is generally better during weekdays, while Monzo/N26 (same FX terms) are better during the weekends. This is corroborated by another analysis I recommend here. What I find is that the officially published daily MasterCard rates are typically a bit worse on the settlement day. The typical Revolut FX improvement to the “commission free official Mastercard rates” on weekdays is about 0.2-0.4%. A misconception: “Official MasterCard daily rates” are not FX mid-prices but inherently have a small commission embedded called the wholesale FX margin for MasterCard. Note that cards based on the official MasterCard rates settle your payments based on daily published rates on the settlement day, i.e. a few days later. When I say Revolut is 0.2-0.4% better, this means Revolut uniquely settles your FX rate immediately at payment, while N26 and Monzo payments will settle days later through MasterCards system at an on average 0.2-0.4% worse rate, but this is subject to relatively large FX fluctuations. However, the interbank rate at the time of payment is of course the statistically expected forex rate of the other providers in a few days at their settlement time, minus the wholesale commission of Mastercard (or Visa) that is hidden inside these players’ published rates.

In the weekends however, Revolut’s 0.5% commission (except for a few illiquid currencies, most notably the Russian and Thai currency, the commission is 1.5% instead) will trump the MasterCard wholesale commission of ~0.3%, making payments using N26 or Monzo more attractive. For the most liquid currencies however, Revolut offers users to convert and hold monies in advance in the app, allowing them to voluntarily bypass this 0.5% commission. For many emerging market currencies, this is however not possible. Of course, holding multiple zero-yielding pre-paid currency balances for a credit card is not very attractive from an investment point of view anyway. The peace of mind of using N26 (exclusively Euros in the app) and clearing payments at a slightly worse FX rate 5 out of 7 days versus Revolut might not be so bad after all.

Another advantage of N26 is the ease to transfer money as a client gets his own personal bank account, while Revolut – for now – requires you to wire money to an omnibus bank account with a structured code to redirect it to the user. This gets us closer to an all-purpose bank account.

ATM Withdrawals: Revolut offers a monthly 200 EUR no-commission foreign ATM withdrawal limit while charging 2% on any amount in excess of that, while N26 charges 1.7% for all amounts on top of the official Mastercard rate which has 0.3% commission embedded (both charge no fixed costs which are typically 2-6 USD per withdrawal at conventional banks). I don’t expect Revolut to continue the free 200 EUR ATM promotion for long however as they stated it is very expensive for them.

I would recommend N26 for peace of mind and efficiency, while recommending Revolut for nerds.

Lastly, there is the TransferWise MasterCard that is already available in Europe, while soon in the US. This card charges its own commissions published on TW’s website. As this ranges from 0.35% to 1% to the true mid-price, it is the “worst” card. However, for people that often get paid in foreign currencies, paying directly using monies in their foreign TransferWise “borderless account” currency balances in which they got paid (cheaper international transfers is TransferWise’s bread and butter) allow them to circumvent commissions using this MasterCard.

Some referral links to get a free card and account at N26Transferwise Borderless, or Revolut.

If you want to cherrypick the best features of any card and retro-actively change the payment from one underlying card to another card for free, start using Curve, a fintech card that aggregates all your existing credit cards into one. If you sign up with code WJ29Z here, you and I get 5 bucks.

How do these players make money

Judging from internet forums, people assume Revolut makes its money from add-ons such as buying cryptocurrency at higher commissions, insurance and premium card subscriptions. While true, I suspect the bulk of income right now is from a piece of the pie Revolut has negotiated with its issuing bank of credit cards: credit card payments collect interchange commissions charged to merchants and paid to the issuing bank. While Europe has capped credit card commissions for merchants at 0.2%, in the rest of the world these interchange commissions for the issuing bank are typically 1.2-2% (note there’s other commissions paid by merchants for the payment terminal operator and MasterCard/Visa). Lastly, I suspect Revolut makes a tiny spread on forex versus the true interbank rate it trades at, as I will detail later.

Why IBKR’s credit card could be the unknown better alternative to the current fintech players

While Revolut offers the best rates amongst its fintech peer group most of the time, it is using the rate offered in the market to convert (not the mid but the bid) and hence the customer should lose half of the bid-ask spread in a conversion. Broker customers of IBKR get direct access to the live interbank market. IBKR aggregates for its clients the best quotes of 16 of the world’s largest FX dealing banks that have an aggregate 60% global market share. Using real-time FX data as IBKR clients, we can see the real-time bid and hence can test Revolut’s claim.

Could IBKR be better than Revolut to pay in Mexican pesos?

I made screenshots of IBKR’s FX bid prices seconds before and after two consecutive Revolut payments at 11:50 and 11:53 local time. I also appended the FX traded range of the minute and compared it to Revolut’s payment settled rate (minute resolution for the zoomed candlestick chart). Note the time in my Revolut payment screenshot is shifted by 7 hours as I made this screenshot when back home and there’s a 7-hour time difference to Mexico.

Chichen Itza

Figure 1 Own screenshots of Revolut app and IBKR live forex rates

In another payment on another day, I show the bid-ask spread that is quoted minutes before the payment, and the traded price range of the minute on the other hand.

Monica Herrera.jpg

Figure 2 Own screenshots of Revolut app and IBKR live forex rates

At the second payment in my first picture, the average bid rate of the bid rate seconds before (middle screenshot) and bid rate after payment (right screenshot) was 22,74565 while my Revolut payment was settled at 22,7437. The difference is 0,00195.

In the second picture, the Revolut settlement was at 22,6553 while the bid price in the minute of payment should have been at worst 22,6585 minus 0,015 or 22,6570 (that is, the bottom of the candlestick on the minute of payment minus the bid-mid spread). IB is at least 0,0020 better.

I did not make bid screenshots for the first payment in the first figure (on the left). I believe the rate I saw but did not take a screenshot of was close to the upper end (ending price of the candlestick). Based on this, and the bid-mid, I estimate in this instance IB was 0,0033 better.

Wrap-up: it seems Revolut in this example is at least 20 pips worse than IBKR’s interbank bid price. For the Mexican Peso Euro pair, IBKR rates give you at least a 0.0088% better rate (20 pips divided by EUR MXN of ~22,7), or 0.88 basis points. However, for small trades, the IBKR FX commission is 0.2 basis points. The net improvement should be 0.68 basis points. When spending 5000 $ in Mexico, this gets you to a very small saving of 34 cents. Very small compared to the difference between Revolut and contenders N26/Monzo using the “official MasterCard FX rates” in which the difference was 0,3%. For a 5000 $ spend using Revolut versus these competitors, this makes a 15 $ difference.

Why IBKR is not as good for FX vs Revolut today, but could be: IBKR actually uses the currency conversion of MasterCard for its credit card payments (your FX payment will be deducted from your base currency in your brokerage account), while customers can trade in the interbank market on their brokerage accounts at a 0.68 basis points better FX rate than Revolut. This doesn’t make any sense and I will recommend IBKR to implement the Revolut system.

Other IBKR credit card USPs versus fintech players

  • Deep borrowing capacity: remember how credit card providers pitch deep borrowing capacity as a selling point in “gold cards”? IBKR credit card payments are only limited by your brokerage account net worth. If you want, you can heavily indebt yourself using margin debt up to 2-3X your brokerage net worth
  • Unrivalled cheap borrowing at the overnight rate plus a tiny spread (see here)
  • Commission free foreign ATM withdrawals with a fixed cost of 0.50$ (using of course Mastercard’s wholesale FX rates): remember N26 charges 1.7% on top of the wholesale FX rate for withdrawals
  • More efficient use of your assets: pooling effect as you spend from your brokerage account instead of having many zero-yielding cash balances at different brokerage/bank accounts (as of recently, IBKR added a lot of daily banking capabilities such as recurring payments etc.)

Conclusion

The IBKR credit card is not discussed on Fintech forums but has the potential to be even more attractive than the payment cards of Revolut, N26, Monzo and especially Transferwise*.

Another post will follow with an IBKR investment thesis, digging more into the brokerage account details.

I recommend an IBKR account for anyone above >100K$ (for smaller accounts, I only recommend IBKR if you are at least making two trades per month). You can open an account here.

To get a free FX credit card and account, here’s some affiliate links to N26Transferwise Borderless, or Revolut.

If you want to cherrypick the best features of any card and retro-actively change the payment from one underlying card to another card for free, start using Curve, a fintech card that aggregates all your existing credit cards into one. If you sign up with code WJ29Z here, you and I get 5 bucks.

* This post was about payments, but IBKR is much cheaper than TransferWise for large international money transfers: note that if IBKR clients have local bank accounts in multiple countries (e.g. a US expat living in Australia), clients can use local transfers via their IBKR brokerage accounts to transfer huge sums of money from one country to another at the real interbank rates (e.g. depositing AUD from Australian bank account to IBKR, converting at the real interbank rate, withdrawing the converted USD to a US bank account). This can save them 0.3-1% of TransferWise FX commissions. When our expat returns from Australia and buys a 1 MUSD house in San Francisco, he saves 4500$ (as per this TransferWise fee link; TW charges 0.45% for AUD-USD transfers).

Disclosure: I am/we are long IBKR and used affiliate links of the cards we recommend and used above.

Follow us on Twitter

Follow us on Twitter for interesting investments we might not do a blogpost on.

The HLP Lessons

In the past couple of months, I spent a lot of time and effort researching Hang Lung Properties (HLP). It is a Hong-Kong listed commercial property developer and owner. HLP has a portfolio of prime retail properties in HK and mainland China. My initial interest in the company originated from my belief that despite the threat from eCommerce, well-positioned shopping malls in demographically strong areas should continue to do well.

There is a lot to like about the company at first glance. It was trading at close to 4% dividend yield, a strong development pipeline and have at least 2-3% rent growth from its existing shopping mall portfolio. The shopping malls are relatively high-end and located in some of the biggest cities in China. Most importantly, it seems to have a well-aligned management (HLP is family controlled) and a “legendary” capital allocator at its helm. I recommend you read the Hang Lung’s Chairman Letters where the CEO’s impeccable ability to time the real estate cycle and reluctance to overpay are both well documented.

It was almost too good to be true. You have 1) very competent capital allocator, 2) a high-quality retail properties portfolio, 3) a highly visible development pipeline, and 4) a cheap valuation for this business quality. I allowed myself to become very excited about the company as I devoured the Chairman Letter religiously. I am actively looking for evidence to further support my investment thesis. Sure there are a few problems but as a long-term investor, I can look past these “short-term” issues.

However, as I learnt more about these “short-term” issues, inconvenient evidence began to accumulate. The consumption power of Chinese Tier-2 cities does not grow nearly as fast those implied in Hung Lung’s Chairman Letters. The oversupply of retail space in Tier-2 cities would take so many years to digest that the return on incremental retail properties in these Tier-2 cities is just too low for the level of risk involved. However, the company seems focused on its Tier 2 city strategy in China. Not to mention the first mover advantage of the luxury mall in Tier-2 cities is so entrenched that it is a winner-take-most economics. Most luxury brands will not open two stores in a Tier 2 city in China and luxury brands need to co-tenant together. This means that once the first high-quality mall captures most of the large luxury brands in its mall. It is extremely difficult for the second and third mall to compete. You can build mid-end malls but then you would have so many similar malls that the low rent almost guarantees an unsatisfactory return. Chinese Tier-2 cities retail space is over-supplied from high-end to low-end malls.

At this point, I am just confused. Why would such a smart and rationale capital allocator commit to such an obviously sub-par strategy? As I spoke to people who are close to the Chairman, it became clear that this is an individual who has a huge ego. It would be extremely difficult for him to openly admit the mistake and change course. It is unclear to me if he is just too proud to admit the mistake or that admitting the mistake to something that is so central to his personal identity (he sees himself as the smart guy that never overpays) is just too difficult for him.

In any case, I learn quite a few lessons which I can take along with as I continue my adventure in the investing jungle.

  1. Don’t give too much credit to CEO / Chairman just because they can write fantastic annual letters
  2. When the business’s core operation is transformed in volume or in nature (in Hang Lung’s case from property management to property development), one cannot assume that the company will naturally be able to adapt
  3. Even when the manager is heavily invested in the company, the ego can still get in the way such that mistakes are not corrected
  4. Human irrationality is more powerful than you might think
  5. Past track record does not guarantee future success

Of course, I could just be wrong in thinking that building malls in Chinese Tier 2 cities is a sub-par investment strategy. I hope I am wrong.

MC

Dart Group Memo – 25th Nov 2017

Dart Group (DTG) released its latest 1H FY18 results on 16th Nov 2017. Operating results were very satisfactory. The total number of passenger sector flown for the period between Mar-Sep 2017 increased by 41% while the ticket yield decreased by 17% from GBP 92 to GBP 76. With the competitive pricing, load factor remained at an impressive 93.2%. Consequently, leisure travel revenue grew 36%. Operating profit grew 22% which led to a continued margin compression of 12.3% as compared to 13.5% in 1H FY17.

Advanced sales grew by 38% from GBP 519m to GBP 713m which is indicating a strong growth for the Winter of 2017/2018. The growth in Winter programme corresponds to Jet2’s capacity expansion as the company grows its aircraft fleet. Strong free cash flow generation with impact from working capital is largely neutral. Capex spend is expected to be much higher in 2H 17 with aircraft delivery.

All things considered, this is a very impressive operation performance by the Dart Group management. The share price rallied strongly upon the release of the set of performance. The market seemed to value DTG very differently over a 5-month period. However, the intrinsic value of DTG most definitely did not change as much as that implied by the share price. I added to my position after Mr Market taking a dim view of the company’s prospect after results release in July 2017. I am glad that Mr Market has changed his view since then.

Post the recent share price rally, DTG is the biggest position in my portfolio by far (~30%). Naturally, I am re-evaluating the appropriate sizing for DTG. To arrive at what is the optimal position size, one would need to understand 1) the expected upside and 2) the downside risks.

DTG can generate further upside by 1) growing its free cash flow; 2) pay down of debt 3) expansion of valuation of multiple. While I do believe that the current multiple on DTG is on the conservative side, I typically do not count on multiple expansion for value creation. As such I would focus on future earnings growth and value creation to equity holder through debt repayment. DTG can generate further earnings growth by:

  1. Volume growth – this can be achieved either through 1) expanding to new airport and 2) adding new routes to existing airports

  1. Pricing growth – this can be achieved either through 1) increasing prices and 2) improving revenue mix by getting customers to purchase higher valued products

  1. Cost efficiency – given that the mix of aircraft is skewing towards new planes, one would expect some degree of operational efficiencies

  1. Operating leverage – as DTG continue to grow in its bases, it should be able to spread fixed cost over larger revenue and achieve some margin expansion. This is especially true at newer bases

DTG might be able to expand to new bases to generate further growth, but it would not be prudent to anchor an investment on such an aggressive assumption. I am happy to be wrong here. So in this analysis, I assume that future volume growth is only coming from adding new routes to existing bases. In the short term, DTG is likely to enjoy high single-digit volume growth due to the collapse of Monarch. In the longer term, DTG is unlikely to grow its volume above the market as competition in the airline/holiday industry is intense. Similarly, on the pricing side, I suspect pricing growth is very limited due to competition. But DTG does get some insulation from pure price competition because they are focused on holiday destinations and are currently very profitable while being very price competitive. Putting the two together, DTG’s organic revenue growth over the next five years is unlikely to exceed 10% while the risk of a cyclical downturn is more severe at current valuation.

By replacing older aircrafts with modern aircrafts, DTG should be able to realise cost savings through fuel efficiency and lower maintenance cost. But the impact of this should be fully incorporated by 2019. It is difficult to estimate this precisely, but I am not expecting a more than 1% of EBIT margin improvement. On the other hand, the risk of a higher fuel price weighs down on the cost savings from the new planes. Operational leverage might kick in with further growth, but this is difficult to quantify.

Putting the above together, I estimate that Jet2 will run at around 11-12m pax capacity with 91% load factor. Assuming a conservative pricing environment, I get GBP 2.4bn revenue in 2019. With an 11.5% EBITDA margin and no working capital benefit, I get ~ GBP 200m operating cash flow. The question of what is the right maintenance capex is a difficult one. I assume that with newer aircrafts in the fleet, the run-rate maintenance capex is close to GBP 60m. Deducting the maintenance capex, the FCF would be ~GBP 150m; implying a close to 15% free cash flow yield on GBP 1bn market cap. Assume that all FCF is used for debt repayment, equity value should increase while the FCF yield would decrease assuming that FCF doesn’t increase too much over time. In today’s world, 15% FCF is still a very attractive rate. Nonetheless, the upside on DTG is probably around 30-50% without any multiple expansion. Given that, I have investment opportunities with similar downside risk but 100% upside. It no longer makes sense to allocate such a large size to DTG.

However, Jet2 is still the best-valued package holiday business where it strikes a great balance between customer service, experience and price. The company is managed by an excellent management team and a well-aligned owner operator. Jet2’s position as value for money package holiday operator should prove to be most robust in a recessionary environment.

At this point, I believe 15% position size is probably the right one for DTG. I am retaining a large position size because I am very keen to partner alongside a competent and well-align management at a reasonable if not cheap valuation. However, I will be selling down more DTG shares.

MC

Why is successful investing so hard?

I am fascinated with the notion that investing is “simple but not easy”. The principles of investing look deceitfully simple, buy low and sell high, while the execution of these principles can be hellishly hard. And the execution is hard because the process of learning and improving from the mistakes in investing does not work in the same way as it does with other activities such as sports.

First, unlike most sports activities, investing lacks an immediate feedback loop where the outcome of an investment decision is presented at once and mistakes analysed. One must, sometimes, wait for years before knowing the outcome of an investment decision which meant useful learnings and improvements potentially come on the back of a string of mistakes. It is the equivalent of trying to improve baseball batting skills but only knows the result of each bat one year later.

Second, the quality of the feedback is very weak as the investment outcomes do not always reflect the strength of the investment decision, i.e. one can be right for the wrong reasons or wrong for the right reasons. The inability to determine the precise causes for a particular investment outcome is very dangerous as one can put huge confidence in the wrong lessons learnt. It is analogous to practising basketball shots in the dark. One would have to rely solely on the sound of the basketball hitting the rim to determine how much more or less strength to apply for the next time. The lack of information for shot calibration impedes the basketball player’s rate of improvement.

Third, most lessons in investing have nuances and contexts such that they can only be applied to certain conditions and environments. In another word, these lessons are seldom generalised. The trick here is to balance between following the broad prescriptions of investment lessons but also able to recognise the exceptions to the rule. For example, a shrewd investor would rightfully conclude that based on historical precedents to avoid heavy-indebted companies is a wise thing to do. However, John Malone’s TCI supported by its steady cash flow is heavily indebted, but it turned out to be a great investment.

Fortunately, we stand on the shoulders of giants today. We can study the life of great investors and learn from their success and mistakes. We can observe the rise and fall of companies to find patterns. However, there is no better way to learn and grow as an investor than to work alongside like-minded and very accomplished investors.

TC & MC

Loyalty program series: Blue Chip Stamps case study

Loyalty program operators are similar to insurance operations in the sense that they issue a claim “stamps” or “air miles” in exchange for cash upfront “float” (industry term “billings”). This cash or “float” can then be invested while the clients slowly (or never, see breakage) redeem their points or miles (industry term “redemptions”).

Earning streams

Ordered by increasing amount of uncertainty, money is earned through

  1. taking a margins on a mile billed minus a mile redeemed
  2. selling customer habit analytics to companies
  3. breakage: this can be a significant ~20-50% of billings, with ~100% pre-tax margin
  4. investment income and capital gains from investing the float (other people’s money)
  5. point devaluations: this comes at the expense of the loyalty program’s reputation if done visibly, but remains largely unregulated. Companies should take an example from central banks and slowly but steadily devalue (as in “the optimal inflation target is 2% p.a.”)

Float from customers and the government (other people’s money²)

From day one the “billings” cash comes in with most of the revenue still unrecognized (except for a conservative breakage estimate), and offsetting “deferred liabilities” on the balance sheet. This means that almost no cash taxes are paid upfront.

In other words, this business uses other people’s money (clients) to earn extra money on the investment side, while deferring the cash taxes due on real loyalty earnings far into the future (after accounting for real breakage and devaluations down the road).

Powerful psychological biases working in favor of loyalty operator

I think there are some powerful psychological biases working in a loyalty card issuer’s advantage:

  • small amount of miles in every purchase “feels” like it was earned for free, or an “extra” (this is far from the truth, as loyalty programs get paid cash on day one for these points and an alternative to miles is cash back credit cards)
    • people do not value things they got for free as much as things they “worked” for
      • Result n1.: neglect of points that leads to slow devaluation of redemption liability and breakage
  • because the points are not expressed in usual fiat money terms, and they feel for free, the urge to buy unnecessary goods is bigger (perfume, hotel upgrades etc), this is similar to buying presents for friends.
    • see Dan Ariely’s The Perfect Gift : something you always wanted but never wanted to feel the pain of paying for
    • these products have a knack of carrying higher profit margins
    • the loyalty company will use its purchasing power pool to negotiate hefty discounts from retail cost on these high-margin products
      • Result n2.: sales mix is typically profitable for redemption partners (perfume, seat or hotel upgrades) and loyalty partner will take a nice piece of those economics

Case study from the past: Buffett & Munger’s investment in Blue Chip Stamps

I now want to present a very interesting case study from the past, Buffett and Munger’s purchase of loyalty program Blue Chip Stamps (’70s business).

 

The main takeaway is that Blue Chip Stamps’ revenue (~’gross billings’) declined heftily in 10 years, while the float more or less kept up. Why?

  • part of the declining revenue cumulatively adds to the float, while
  • the redemption frequency drops as the program loses mindshare and people forget/delay spending points

bluechip

In other words, permanently declining loyalty programs can still be valuable vehicles to compound investments in, using other people’s money.

Case study today: Aimia

Today, Aimia is trading at ~1.5 x current cash flow, with gross assets (excl. loyalty card liabilities) worth about 2x current share price because of the uncertainty surrounding the major partner Air Canada “AC” that is leaving in 2020 (10% of accumulation but 50% of redemption).

Aimia’s loyalty card “Aeroplan” is one of the biggest in Canada.

Network effects of being big

There is many-sided network effects involved.

What makes the program valuable?

  • # of Accumulation Partners (partners that pay upfront cash “billings” to Aimia for offering clients miles)
  • # of Redemption Partners (partners that allow to redeem miles with products, getting paid by Aimia)
  • # of Clients

Each category interacts, e.g. more redemption and accumulation partners makes the program more valuable for clients, more redemption partners and clients makes the program more valuable for accumulation partners, etc.

Lastly, it’s all about “the big data” nowadays. More # of each category makes Aeroplan’s data analytics more valuable because the number of interactions (data) increases faster than the individual amounts.

download.jpg

Case study investment case

IF

  • Aeroplan’s cash flow remains stable until 2020 and
  • post-2020 cash flows minus its real liabilities are worth at least 0, this is an attractive investment (worth ~10$ per share).

It seems unlikely that management would not be able to manage its way through a “run on the bank” redemption before the 2020 expiry of AC by delaying customer redemptions through two control mechanisms that induce clients to delay and forget:

  1. “gating” (offering limited redemption options ‘temporarily’, e.g. only flights on wednesday and sunday)
  2. devaluing points faster: this has the effect that more people will have insufficient miles to redeem products they deem valuable, hence delay and forget

Given the network effects and switching hassle for customers, I do not believe Aeroplan is going away abruptly as the market seems to think (maybe slowly, but then again Blue Chip Stamps is an interesting case).

Disclaimer: no position*

*Not yet comfortable in the industry.

Comments are welcome.

MC & TC

« Older posts Newer posts »

© 2019 Pembridgecap

Theme by Anders NorenUp ↑